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DU Not A High Priority for
Antinuclear Movement
T
wo years ago, members of anti-nuclear-
weapons groups began to ask our views
about the alarm raised by the
International Action Center in its book,
Metal of Dishonor, about the use of deplet-
ed uranium (DU) penetrators in anti-armor
munitions [1].  We were asked whether the
hazard was so great that activists should
give priority to banning DU.   
We read Metal of Dishonor and found
that, despite the contributions of physicists
and radiation-effects analysts, it contained
no quantitative risk estimate.  We therefore
decided to provide the best one we could,
using information available in the literature
about the health effects of uranium and ion-
izing radiation. 
We concluded that, except for soldiers
in vehicles when they are struck, or individu-
als who crawl around inside such vehicles
without adequate respiratory protection for
extended periods of time later on, the health
effects of DU are likely to be very small.  The
radiation effects would be well below those
of natural background radiation and the
chemical effects would be well below the
thresholds for known toxic effects [2].
Contaminated armored vehicles and pieces
of depleted uranium, however, are potential
hazards and should be cleaned up or
buried—something which was not done in
most cases after Desert Storm and is only
being done now in Kosovo.
IPPNW’s statement does not disagree
with our conclusion—nor similar conclusions
that have been arrived at by every peer-
reviewed study of which we are aware.  It
argues, however, for a ban on the use of DU
on the basis that “the military utility of DU
weapons for the users does not justify any
added health risk for non-combatants, no
matter how small.”  Of course, no weapon
would pass such a test.  The IPPNW state-
ment is therefore not helpful in answering
the question: “How important is this issue
relative to all the others confronting the
anti-nuclear-weapons movement?”
The IPPNW statement urges that “the
health of military and civilian populations
that have been exposed to DU in the Gulf
and in the Balkans should be monitored
closely in the years ahead.”  In our view, this
would be useful only for populations for
which there is quantitative evidence of sig-
nificant DU exposure.  The best evidence is
obtainable through urine tests.  It is not too
late to conduct such measurements for sol-
diers or civilians who believe they have been
exposed to DU in the Balkans. Samples col-
lected from 171 Germans before and after
their service in Kosovo showed no increase
in uranium concentration [3]. There is no
justification for a full-scale epidemiological
study of such a population.
The IPPNW statement also raises the
issue “that the DU munitions used in the
Gulf war and in the Balkans were tainted
with plutonium, U-236, and other sub-
stances far more intensely radioactive than
U-238.”  Here again, a quantitative perspec-
tive would be useful.  The dose from inhaled
DU contaminated with 1 part per million
(ppm) plutonium or 0.3% U-236 would be
about 50% greater than the dose from an
equal amount of uncontaminated DU.  The
maximum contamination measurements that
we have seen are about an order of magni-
tude lower than these levels; concentrations
measured in samples of DU metal used for
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tank armor are several orders of magnitude
l o w e r1 [4]. 
In summary, the IPPNW statement pro-
vides no basis to change our conclusions: 
1) The health risks from DU are not
great enough to make efforts to ban its use
a high priority for the anti-nuclear-weapons
movement; but
2) DU-contaminated vehicles and
pieces of DU on the battlefield should never-
theless be removed or buried to minimize
exposure to those who subsequently may
live in or visit the area.
—Steve Fetter, Frank N. von Hippel
USA
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Depleted Uranium and the
Geneva Conventions
The statement on depleted uranium by theexecutive committee of IPPNW is bal-
anced and useful. I have difficulties, howev-
er, with the statement that the use of DU
weapons should be considered “a form of
ecological warfare prohibited by the Geneva
Conventions.” Article 55 of Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions (1977)  prohibits “the
use of methods or means of warfare which
are intended or may be expected to cause
such damage to the natural environment
and thereby to prejudice the health or sur-
vival of the population.”
I have not found reliable evidence for
the assumption that the areas contaminated
with DU will be unsuitable for human habi-
tation or agriculture because of the radioac-
tivity. The increase in background radiation
to which the population will be subject is
negligible. The remaining weapons contain-
ing DU are more of a concern. Children are
likely to play in the abandoned tanks con-
taining substantial amounts of DU in the
form of fine hard dust, and may collect
shells and fragments containing of DU. The
tanks and ammunition should be collected
and removed. 
Like lead, uranium is taken up and cir-
culated in the ecosystems to a very limited
degree. The chemical toxicity of the heavy
metal uranium is somewhat similar to that
of lead. In many countries children have suf-
fered brain damage after eating lead in flak-
ing paint in houses. While uranium in
artillery shells is much harder than lead and
the chances of ingestion are smaller, chemi-
cal toxicity is a consideration.
A careful study has been published on
29 US soldiers who were exposed to “friend-
ly fire” that destroyed 15 US tanks in the
Gulf war, and who were examined seven
years later [1]. These servicemen carry DU in
their bodies as dust or as fragments in
amounts much larger than can be expected
for the civilian population. Despite this, the
increase in radioactivity in their bodies was
far below the level contributed by the back-
ground. Very sensitive indicators of kidney
damage were normal. In one of several tests
for cognitive function there was some
degree of dysfunction.
Physicians are on safe ground when we
demand that DU should not be used in
weapons until its possible chemical and
physical toxicity is better known. We have
however no evidence that DU is causing
environmental danger of a type and degree




1. McDiarmid M et al. Environ Res Sect A
2000;82:168-180.
1. An Oak Ridge study found that the highest
ratios of U-236/U-235 and Pu-239/U-238 in the
solid “heels” left in containers of the enriched
uranium hexafluoride produced by the
Paducah enrichment plant, where uranium
from US plutonium-production reactors was
enriched, correspond respectively to 0.01% U-
236 and 0.1 ppm Pu-239 in DU containing
0.2% U-235.
